Subsidiarity: Judging the Appropriate Level

The Distributist Review’s own Paleocrat has posted a fascinating rumination on what subsidiarity really is. He convincingly argues that I, like many others, have been using the term rather imprecisely.

Oftentimes subsidiarity is described as the principle that the lowest possible level of society ought to be performing a given function. I myself have often defined it as such. It’s understandable that many people think of it that way, given modernity’s unquenchable penchant for harmful centralization. Indeed, Pope Pius XI’s own formulation, in Quadragesimo Anno, was clearly concerned primarily with larger corporations eating up the functions of smaller, not the reverse. That saintly pope noted specifically that “it is an injustice, a grave evil and a disturbance of right order, for a larger and higher association to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower societies,” making no mention of usurpation the other way around. So it’s only sensible that distributists likewise have traditionally concerned themselves more with over-centralization, rather than over-decentralization, though naturally both are problematic.

Furthermore, I think Paleocrat’s “libertarian-leaning distributists” violate even this “smaller is always better” definition of subsidiarity, because they allow no real corporations between the state and the individual, meaning that the state is the only possible choice for any function the individual cannot himself perform. While they themselves will argue that private individuals can still get together and do things, rather than the state, the fact remains that any time one did not want domination by private individuals seeking private profit, one would be forced to resort to the state and to nothing else. What type of real subsidiarity is possible with such individualistic atomism?

Nevertheless, Paleocrat’s argument is quite persuasive and, ultimately, correct; subsidiarity should be understood as saying not that the lowest possible level should be doing things, but that the right level should be doing them.

However, this does beg the question: how do we determine what the appropriate level of society is? I think the answer to this does depend, in part, on how high or low an order we’re operating on. Many factors will play into our determination of what order of society is appropriate for what functions, and our conclusions will vary considerably depending on local circumstances. Still, here’s a few of the considerations that I think are most important.

The nature of the task and the order in question. Obviously, what the task is, and what order we’re looking at, will be pivotal in determining whether the task is appropriate to that order or some other. The best example of this is educating children. The nature of the task itself, and the nature of the family itself, make it quite clear that the family is the appropriate order for this task. (Of course, it’s not always as simple as that; certain types of education are probably better done by other orders. But the general principle, I think, stands.)

The level of the order. While what Paleocrat calls “libertarian-leaning distributists” will probably balk at his conclusion, statist-leaning distributists will probably balk at what I’m about to say. However, the level of the order does have a good bit to say about whether it’s the appropriate order for a given task.

Let’s consider the education of children as another example, here in the United States. To assign this task to the federal government would be nothing short of ridiculous, and it would be ridiculous precisely because the federal government is too high an order for it. Education needs to be responsive to local needs; schools need to respond to local disciplinary problems; and so on. The federal government is just too high up, too large and broad-based, to effectively do the job.

On the other hand, the individual family is arguably too low-level to do all of it. The base of human knowledge is simply too broad even for two well-educated parents to teach their children completely on their own. My knowledge of calculus, dimly recalled from high school classes many years ago, just can’t cut it; I’m going to need help teaching my children that.

So while “always let the lowest possible level do it” is certainly not an accurate application of subsidiarity, the level of the order in question is a vital consideration. A distributist need not be libertarian-leaning to assert that most functions currently performed at a high level of society ought to be done by one considerably lower.

The state itself is a corporation of last resort. The state exists in order to direct subsidiary corporations toward the common good. As such, it has a vital role to perform. The common libertarian notion of “our enemy, the state” is fundamentally antithetical to distributism, and to Catholic social thought in general. The state is not only our friend, but it’s a good and necessary part of human society. As Aristotle rightly observed millennia ago, the man who can live rightly outside of the state must be either a beast or a god; he cannot be a man.

Catholic social teaching gives us the criteria for determining when the state needs to be involved:

[I]t is rightly contended that certain forms of property must be reserved to the State, since they carry with them an opportunity to domination too great to be left to private individuals without injury to the community at large.

Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno. Clearly, the state has a role to play, but it’s not one to be played lightly. The argument that Pius is supporting here is that the state is an appropriate agent when the “opportunity to domination is too great to be left to private individuals.”

The military is an obvious example. Entrusting the defense of the realm to private individuals was tried in the Middle Ages, and worked reasonably well; unfortunately, it also resulted in frequent internecine warfare and armies difficult to direct to a single purpose for any considerable length of time. Our current system of entrusting national defense to the state is sensible and wise; even though the job could be done effectively by a lower level of society, it is done better and more appropriately by the state exclusively.

On the other hand, one could argue (and I would, personally) that entrusting personal defense entirely to the state would be deleterious. I work with the local police on a daily basis, and respect them immensely; they do an excellent job with overly limited resources and deserve our support. But they can’t do everything. Permitting private citizens who have not otherwise forfeited their right to do so (for example, by conviction of a felony) to possess weapons for their own defense, and to use them for that purpose if necessary, is only sensible. Entrusting personal defense entirely to the state, forbidding lower corporations from defending themselves and owning the means necessary to do so, would be a violation of subsidiarity.

The reasoning behind not giving a task to the state if it’s not necessary is the same as that behind giving it to the state if it is. That is, the “opportunity to domination” just isn’t great enough to justify it. One must, of course, always consider this factor, even when the state is not in question; private corporations can dominate just as effectively as the state can. However, with the state the issue is much more relevant. The distributist need not be reminded about the benefits of private ownership; ownership and performance of a function by private—by which I mean simply non-governmental—organizations ought to be preferred, wherever possible, to that by state organizations.

As commentator Marchmain on Paleocrat’s article remarked, Pope John XXIII in Mater et Magistra probably said it best:

It should be stated at the outset that in the economic order first place must be given to the personal initiative of private citizens working either as individuals or in association with each other in various ways for the furtherance of common interests.

The state when necessary; but only when really necessary. Non-state corporations are to be preferred whenever possible.

And that doesn’t even begin to address what level of the state would be the appropriate actor, even once we’ve determined that the state must be the one to do it.

Obviously, many other factors will play into this analysis. Frequently there will be great room for overlap. Furthermore, the appropriate level for a task will vary considerably according to local conditions; for example, the state may be an appropriate provider of health care in one community but not in another. However, Paleocrat has given distributists a lot of food for thought with his recent posting, for which I, for one, am grateful. I’ll be pondering this one for some time.

Praise be to Christ the King!